All posts

PQC Basics · Part 3 of 10

So What Is a CBOM, Actually?

August 20, 2026 ·  PQCClear  ·  6 minute read

Two posts in, we've talked around this term without defining it. Time to fix that. Here's what a cryptographic bill of materials, or CBOM, actually is, in plain terms, with a real example of what one looks like.

The Definition, in One Sentence

A CBOM is a list of every piece of encryption a system uses, written down in enough detail that someone can actually evaluate it.

That’s the whole definition. Everything else is detail on top of it. Last post, we saw that a component list (an SBOM) can tell you a system uses a well-known encryption library, but stops short of telling you what that library is actually configured to do. A CBOM is what fills that gap. It doesn’t just name the library. It records the specific algorithm in use, the key size, the certificate behind it, and what data it’s protecting.

What's Actually in One

Rather than describe this abstractly, here’s what a single entry in a CBOM might contain, for one piece of a fairly ordinary system: the part that encrypts customer login sessions.

Customer login session encryption

Sample entry

Where it's used
Customer-facing login service
Algorithm
RSAA widely used method for securing data, in use since the 1970s.
Key size
2048-bitDetermines how difficult the encryption is to break by brute force.
What it protects
Session tokens, authentication data
Certificate status
Valid, expires in 11 months
Flagged concern
Vulnerable to a sufficiently advanced quantum computerMore on exactly what this means in the next post.

Notice what changed compared to a simple component list. It’s not “this system uses RSA” as a bare fact. It’s specifically where RSA is used, at what strength, protecting what, and whether that combination is still considered sound. A real system might have dozens or hundreds of entries like this one, covering every login, every database, every internal connection between services.

Why This Took Longer to Build Than a Component List

A fair question at this point: if SBOMs already exist, why didn’t someone just do the same thing for encryption years ago? The honest answer is that it’s a harder problem, for a specific reason.

Finding out which components a piece of software uses is largely a matter of reading a list the software itself provides, the same way checking a car’s parts list means reading the manufacturer’s documentation. Finding out how encryption is actually configured usually means looking directly at how the code is written and how the system behaves, because that configuration often isn’t written down anywhere on its own. Two systems can use the exact same encryption library and still be set up completely differently underneath it.

Manufacturing

Same parts, different builds

Two cars can use the identical model of airbag from the identical supplier, and still be wired into the vehicle in ways that behave completely differently in a crash. The part being present tells you almost nothing about how it's actually deployed.

Software

Same library, different settings

Two applications can use the exact same encryption library and still land at very different outcomes, one using a strong, current configuration and the other left on defaults set years ago and never revisited.

This is also why building the tools that generate a CBOM automatically is a genuinely active area of work right now, not a solved problem from a decade ago. The tooling exists and is improving quickly, but it’s still catching up to what SBOM tooling can already do reliably.

A component list tells you what’s present. A CBOM tells you whether what’s present is actually still safe.

That distinction is the whole reason this series exists. It’s also exactly why this is becoming urgent right now, which is where we’re headed next.

The flagged concern above, explained next

Part 4 covers the deadline side of this: what a quantum computer actually threatens, why nobody’s encryption is broken today, and what changed in 2026 to put a clock on it.

Read part 4
what is a CBOMcryptographic bill of materialsCBOM exampleCycloneDX

PQC Basics is an ongoing series from PQCClear explaining post-quantum cryptography readiness in plain language, one idea at a time. This post represents PQCClear’s own editorial explanation and should not be construed as technical or legal advice.

The sample entry above is illustrative, not drawn from any specific organization. Key sources: the CycloneDX specification, which defines the cryptographic bill of materials format referenced here; Executive Order 14412 (June 22, 2026) and its cryptographic inventory provisions.